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Allowing Federal Courts Access to
International Court of Justice Advisory
Opinions: Critique and Proposal
By WILLIAM T. MCLAUGHLIN, II
Member of the Class of 1984
I. INTRODUCTION
Supporters of the idea that the rule of law should govern the world
community have generally been disappointed by the meager role the
International Court of Justice (IC) has played in international affairs
and in the development of international law.' For the past twenty
years, the effectiveness and the future of the ICI have been topics of
much scholarly debate.2 The General Assembly of the United Nations
has conducted an extensive review of the role of the ICJ, and has con-
sidered many proposals for change.3 Moreover, even individual na-
tions have shown concern for the Court.'
Considering the amount of attention being focused upon the
Court, it is not surprising to find that there have been a great number of
I. Professor Rovine stated that the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was the "least
successful and most dissappointing major organ of the United Nations." Rovine, The Na-
tional Interest and the World Court, in 1 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF
JUSTICE 313 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
2. The following are a number of the more recent major works on the ICJ: 1 & 2 TilE
FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (L. Gross ed. 1976); MAX PLANCK
INSTITUTE, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES: AN INTERNATIONAL
SYMPOSIUM (1974); R. ANAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION (1969); 1 & 2 S.
ROSENNE, THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT (1965).
3. The General Assembly's Sixth Committee review of the role of the International
Court of Justice began in 1970 and was concluded in 1974. 25 U.N. GAOR, C.6 (1210th-
1218th, 1224th-1226th, 1229th mtgs.) at 189-237, 263-75, 285-91, U.N. Docs.
A/C.6/SR1210-18, 1224-26, 1229 (1970); 26 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1277h-1284th, 1293d-1295th
mtgs.) at 173-221, 269-85, U.N. Docs. A/C.6/SR.1277-84, 1293-95, (1971); 29 U.N. GAOR
C.6 (1465th-1470th, 1486th, 1490th, 1492d mtgs.) at 15-41, 133-35, 160, 166-70, U.N. Docs.
A/C.6/SR.1465-70, 1486, 1490, 1492 (1974).
4. See U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE LEGAL ADVISER, WIDENING ACCESS TO
THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (1976) [hereinafter cited as WIDENING ACCESS].
See also the address by William P. Rogers (then Secretary of State) (Apr. 25, 1970), reprinted
in 64 PROC. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 285, 287 (1970).
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proposals put forth as remedies for the Court's malaise.5 The outlook
for the Court, however, still remains clouded in uncertainty and
doubt.6
The ICJ's role in the world community is an undeniably important
one. The Court is one of the "principal organs" of the United Na-
tions.7 Its two functions, as dictated by the Statute of the ICJ,8 consist
of: (1) adjudicating disputes between member states,9 and (2) render-
ing advisory opinions on legal issues submitted to it by international
organizations and specialized agencies authorized by the General As-
sembly to submit questions.'0 In this respect, the ICJ is similar to its
predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).I I
Yet, compared to the PCIJ, the ICJ has increased neither its activity
nor its influence in the world community. 12
Although it is generally agreed that the Court has failed to live up
to its expectations, there appears to be only a limited consensus as to
the reason for the Court's lack of success. Most of the explanations for
the Court's underuse point to a single factor-that the vast majority of
nation states choose not to risk their interests to the judgment of an
independent international tribunal.13 The result has been that the ICJ,
although accepted as indispensable, has been all but ignored and ne-
5. For a good synopsis of reforms that have been proposed, see Gamble & Fischer, The
International Court of Justice: A Test o/Suggested Reforms, I I INT'L LAW. 163 (1977).
6. Gross, The Function of the International Court o/Justice in the World Community, 2
GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 65 (Supp. 2 1972).
7. U.N. CHARTER art. 92.
8. For the text of the Statute of the ICJ and other important documents pertaining to
the ICJ, see DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE (S. Rosenne ed.
1974). The Statute of the ICJ is also reproduced in 2 S. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 803.
9. I.C.J. Stat. art. 35-36. This Note will not discuss the ICJ's contentious jurisdiction.
For a thorough study on the Court's contentious jurisdiction see 1 & 2 S. ROSENNE, 31pra
note 2. See also Fitzmaurice, Enlargement o/the Contentious Jurisdiction othe Court, in 2
THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 461 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
10. I.C.J. STAT. art. 65.
11. This Note will not examine the Permanent Court of International Justice. For a
detailed study of this court see M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL
JUSTICE 1920-1942 (1943).
12. Lissitzyn, Foreward to M. POMERANCE, THE ADVISORY FUNCTION OF TlE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT IN THE LEAGUE AND U.N. ERAS at ix (1973); see also J. GAMBLE & D.
FISCHER, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF A FAILURE 3-5 (1976).
13. A British delegate to the U.N. stated this factor slightly differently. He credited the
states' reluctance to use the Court mostly to "an excessive preoccupation with a narrow
notion of national sovereignty." 29 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1468th mtg.) at 29, U.N. Doe.
A/C.6/SR.1468 (1974). See also Szasz, Enhancing the Advlsory Competence of the World




glected by the member states of the United Nations. 4
"The development of international law is an objective that states
tend to praise rather than seriously pursue. In particular, governments
generally prefer to keep all law-creating and law-defining processes
firmly within their control, even at the cost of significantly retarding
this important work [of the Court]. '"'5
For one important section of the members of the United Nations,
the status and existence of the ICJ within the Organization is nomi-
nal. 6 This section of the United Nations, made up of communist bloc
nations led by the Soviet Union, has opposed proposals aimed at in-
creasing the use and effectiveness of the Court."7
The majority of member states in the United Nations, however,
favor some form of attempt to reform or modify the Statute of the
Court in order to increase the Court's use. This majority was able to
put through a resolution aimed at strengthening the Court.18 The reso-
lution, however, was watered down in that it merely set forth recom-
mendations and proposed considerations for member states. This
compromised resolution was due to the opposition of the communist
states to any meaningful reform.' 9
The United States has voiced its support for the ICJ, and has ex-
pressed some support for possible reforms of the Court's Statute."0 Un-
14. Anand, Role of International Adjudication, in I THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 1-2 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
15. Szasz, supra note 13, at 511.
16. 1 S. RosENNE,supra note 2, at 111.
17. See the comments made by the delegates of these states in the Sixth Committee's
study of the role of the ICJ, supra note 3. The Soviet representative at the Sixth Committee's
meetings claimed that the ICJ's inactivity was not attributable to a defective statute, but
rather to the Court's handing down "unjust decisions." 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1229th mtg.) at
6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1229 (1970).
18. G.A. Res. 3232, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 141, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974).
19. Id The General Assembly's 1974 resolution was limited to the following recom-
mendations: (1) that states study the possibility of accepting the Court's compulsory juris-
diction under article 36 of its Statute; (2) that states consider inserting in their treaties clauses
providing for the submission of disputes over treaty interpretation or application to the
Court; (3) that states keep under review the possibility of identifying cases in which use can
be made of the Court; (4) that states consider using chambers established under articles 26
and 29 of the Statute of the Court; (5) that United Nations organs and specialized agencies
consider submission of requests for advisory opinions to the Court; and (6) that recourse to
judicial settlement of legal disputes, particularly those referrable to the ICJ, should not be
considered an unfriendly act between states. No mention is made in the resolution of
amendments to the United Nations Charter or to the Statute of the Court.
20. See the statements of Mr. Javits, the United States representative before the Sixth
Committee review of the role of the ICJ. 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1211th mtg.) at 193, U.N.
Doc. A/C.6/SR.1211 (1970). See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, REPORT ON UNITED NATIONS
1983]
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til recently, this support has not taken any concrete form in terms of
action.
In the late 1970's, the United States began to focus more attention
on the ICJ. During the years of President Carter's term in office, con-
cern for the role of the ICJ grew.2 The concern for the Court's un-
deruse finally culminated in the introduction in both houses of
Congress of resolutions calling for the expansion of the ICJ's advisory
jurisdiction.22 The proposal, embodied in both resolutions, would pro-
vide a process whereby designated national courts could petition a spe-
cial committee of the United Nations for an advisory opinion from the
ICJ on questions of international law.23
The resolutions, although outlining the basic structure of the pro-
posal, do not spell out the specific procedures for implementing the
proposal. Rather, these specific procedures were left open for further
discussion, comment, and deliberation.24
REFORM AND RESTRUCTURING, DEP'T OF ST. BULL. (April 1978) [hereinafter cited as U.S.
DEP'T OF STATE]; WIDENING ACCESS, supra note 4.
21. See U.S. DEPr. OF STATE, supra note 20; see also WIDENING ACCESS, supra note 4.
22. S. Con. Res. 85, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); H.R. Con. Res. 86, 97th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Resolutions]. Both resolutions originated with Senator Cranston,
however, the House resolution was introduced by Representative Bingham, at the request of
Senator Cranston. Letter from G. Warburg, Legislative Assistant to Senator Cranston, to
the author (October 6, 1982) (discussing the resolutions and their present status).
23. The text of both resolutions are identical and read as follows:
Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the
sense of the Congress that the President should- (1) direct the permanent
representative of the United States to propose to the United Nations General
Assembly the adoption of a resolution which establishes a special committee
authorized-
(A) to seek an advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice,
upon request by a national court or tribunal which is duly authorized by
national legislation to make such a request, regarding any question of
international law of which such court or tribunal has jurisdiction; and
(B) to establish procedures providing adequate opportunities for
the presentation to the International Court of Justice the views of each
party to the case before the court or tribunal requesting such advisory
opinion; and
(2) after the establishment of the special committee, propose legislation to
the Congress which-
(A) authorizes Federal courts to request such advisory opinions; and
(B) establishes procedures whereby any Federal court may submit
such requests to the special committee; and
(C) defines the scope of acceptance by the United States of the ex-
panded jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice.
Resolutions, supra note 22. For purposes of this Note, both resolutions will be referred to as
the "proposal."
24. Callingfor the Establishment of a Special Committee on Advisory Opinions from the
[Vol. 6
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The American Bar Association (ABA) conducted a study on the
proposal and presented its findings in a report.35 This report contained
a number of suggestions for modifications of the proposal. These sug-
gested modifications were primarily aimed at protecting the rights of
the original litigants and lessening any potential burdens or hardships
due to the referral procedure.26
Although this proposal represents a good faith attempt at increas-
ing the usefulness and effectiveness of the Court, it does not represent a
practical or feasible approach to attain that worthy objective. In partic-
ular, this proposal poses many potential dangers to the interests of both
the United States and the Court.
Besides posing significant dangers, this proposal bears no great as-
surance of any success. The proposal deals with the Court and the
problems of its underutilization in a very indirect manner. Rather than
directly addressing the problem of states not bringing disputes before
the Court, this proposal merely widens access of the national courts to
the ICJ.
As it appears that a great amount of effort will be required in order
to effect any significant reform of the Court,27 a more direct approach
would be better. Such an approach would be for the ICJ to acquire
compulsory jurisdiction over member states of the United Nations in
matters of international law.28
The United States maintains one of the most stringent reservations
International Court of Justice. Hearings on HtA Con. Res. 86 Before the Subcomm. on
Human Rights and International Organizations of the House Comm on Foreign Affairs, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3 (1982) (statement of Mr. Bingham, Representative from New York and
sponsor of the House resolution) [hereinafter cited as Hearings].
25. ABA COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL COURTS, FINAL REPORT (1980) [hereinafler
cited as ABA FINAL REPORT] (expanding the advisory jurisdiction of the ICJ). See also
Hearings, supra note 24, at 51-54 (letter from Professor Sohn to the subcommittee concern-
ig the ABA's report on the proposal).
26. See ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 6-8.
27. Gamble & Fischer, supra note 5, at 172. It is also worthy to note that the U.N. Sixth
Committee took four years before it was able to pass a meek resolution aimed at helping the
Court. See supra notes 18 & 19.
28. The ICJ already has a provision providing for compulsory jurisdiction. I.CJ. STAT.
art. 36(2). The problem is that most states have not accepted this provision, and of those
that have, most have done so with stringent reservations. The declarations of the states
accepting the ICJ's compulsory jurisdiction can be found in DocutEeNTs ON THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JusTIcF, supra note 8, at 255. The United States' reservation to the
Court's jurisdiction is discussed infra notes 29-30 and accompanying text. For a recent study
on the Court's compulsory jurisdiction clause (art. 36(2)) see Merrills, "he Optional Clause
Today, 50 BRIT. YB. INTL L. 87 (1979).
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to the Court's jurisdiction.29 The United States could do much for the
Court's prestige and position in the world community by simply revok-
ing its reservation to the ICJ's jurisdiction and subjecting itself to the
Court's authority in international matters.30
This Note will discuss the proposal embodied in the Congressional
resolutions, and will examine the suggested modifications put forward
by the ABA. This Note will present arguments against the proposal
and present an alternative proposal for enhancing the ICJ's role in the
world community. The discussion will demonstrate that the proposal
embodied in the Congressional resolutions does not represent a practi-
cal or feasible approach to the objective of enhancing the ICJ's role in
world affairs. Finally, this Note will conclude that, in the alternative,
the United States should take the first step toward reaching that objec-
tive by revoking its reservation to the ICJ's jurisdiction.
II. THE PROPOSAL
Presently the ICJ may give an advisory opinion only upon request
of (1) the General Assembly, (2) the Security Council, or (3) other
agencies or organs of the United Nations so authorized by the General
Assembly.3' Most notably excluded from the Court's jurisdiction are
member states, national courts, international organizations, and other
international tribunals.
The proposal embodied in the Congressional resolutions would
29. The United States reservation to the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court, com-
monly referred to as the Connolly Amendment, reads as follows:
[T]he United States of America recognizes as compulsory ipso facto and without
special agreement, in relation to any other State accepting the same obligation, the
jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice in all legal disputes hereinafter
arising. . . Provided, that this declaration shall not apply to. . . (b) disputes with
regard to matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of the
United States of America as determined by the United States of America . . . (em-
phasis added)
The Declaration by the President of the United States of America, August 14, 1946 respect-
ing recognition by the United States of America of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Inter-
national Court of Justice, 61 Stat. 1218, T.I.A.S. 1598, 1 U.N.T.S. 9. For the Senate debates
over the Connally Amendment, see Howard, The Connaly Amendment, I VA. J. INT'L L. 1
(1961).
30. See Merrills, supra note 28, at 116.
31. U.N. CHARTER art. 96. To date, there are approximately 19 organs and agencies
authorized to request advisory opinions from the ICJ: six organs of the U.N., including the
General Assembly and the Security Council; and 13 agencies, including the International
Atomic Energy Agency. See Gross, The International Court of Justce. Consideration ofRe.
quirementsfor Enhancing its Role in the International Legal Order, in 1 TlE FUTURE OF Tits
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 22, 84 (L. Gross ed. 1976).
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modify this by allowing national courts indirect access to the Court.32
A. The Drafted Form
The proposal is drafted in basically two parts. The first part urges
that the President direct the United States representative at the United
Nations to propose adoption of a resolution calling for the establish-
ment of a special committee of the United Nations authorized to re-
quest advisory opinions from the ICJ when requested by a national
court.33 The specifics concerning the composition and procedures of
this specialized committee are not covered by the proposal, and would
be determined by the United Nations General Assembly or some com-
mittee thereof. Some suggestions have been put forth by the ABA in its
report on the proposal.'
Second, upon the establishment of the special committee by the
General Assembly, the President is called upon to propose legislation
authorizing specified United States federal courts to seek advisory
opinions from the ICJ on matters of international law.35
Technically, the request for an advisory opinion from the Court
would come from an authorized agency of the United Nations, and not
from the national court. In this way, it is thought that this proposal
avoids the problem of trying to amend the Statute of the ICJ.36
Amending the Statute of the Court would not only be difficult,37 but
might also stimulate further reforms of the Court which might not be in
the interests of the United States.38
Since the proposal leaves many of the procedural aspects open,39 it
is difficult to readily ascertain all of the problems which might arise.
The ABA did, however, present a report in which it suggested many
modifications to the proposal." It appears that if the resolution does
get through Congress, these suggestions will become an important part
of the proposal.4 '
32. This procedure would be indirect because of the intermediary role played by the
Special Committee of the General Assembly. See supra note 23.
33. Resolutions, supra note 22; see also supra note 23.
34. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25.
35. Resolutions, supra note 22; see also supra note 23.
36. Hearings, supra note 24, at 20 (statements of Mr. Small, Assistant Legal Adviser for
United Nations Affairs, Department of State).
37. Gamble & Fischer, supra note 5, at 172.
38. Hearings, supra note 24, at 62, 66 (statement by Mr. Boyd).
39. Hearings, supra note 24.
40. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25.
41. Note the comments of those appearing before the House subcommittee. ttearings,
supra note 24. The consensus among those attending the subcommittee meeting appeared to
19831
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B. ABA Report
In its report on the proposal, the ABA suggested a number of mod-
ifications be made before it would fully endorse the proposal.42 These
suggestions ranged from the scope and character of the advisory opin-
ions, to the procedures and conditions of referral to the Court.
1. Optional Character
The ABA report stressed that the proposal should make it clear
that the proposed procedure would not be binding upon the member
states of the United Nations until they voluntarily accepted such proce-
dure in a declaration.43 In accepting the procedure, each state would be
entitled to limit its acceptance in "any manner it may deem desira-
ble."'  An example given of limitation on a state's acceptance is that a
state might limit its declaration for a number of years s.4  The ABA also
specified that the declaration would be subject to each state's constitu-
tional processes.'
2. United States Acceptance
The ABA suggested that the United States acceptance of the pro-
posed procedure should be by statute, which would specify the modali-
ties for requesting an opinion, and would establish a process for
reviewing the success or failure of the proposal. 7 The acceptance of
the procedure could be terminated if the experience proved to be
unsatisfactory.48
3. Limitation of Acceptance
In the ABA's opinion, the scope of the United States acceptance
should be limited, at least initially, to the interpretation and the appli-
cation of multilateral or bilateral treaties.4 9
be that all or most of the modifications proposed by the ABA would be drafted into the
proposal.
42. See ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 11; see also Hearings, sutpra note 24, at
51 (statement by Professor Sohn).
43. See ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 9; see also Hearings, supra note 24, at 51.
44. Hearings, supra note 24, at 51; see also ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 9.
45. Hearings, supra note 24, at 51.
46. Id
47. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 9. See also Hearings, supra note 24, at 51-52.
48. Hearings, supra note 24, at 51-52.
49. See ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 9. States will find that granting the ICJ,
or another international adjudicatory body, exclusive jurisdiction over this area of interna-
tional law, the interpretation of treaties, is in their own best interests. States will discover
[Vol. 6
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4. Conditions for Reference to the Court
Originally, the ABA Committee on International Courts proposed
that issues of international law should be referred to the ICJ if one of
the parties to the litigation so requests or if the United States court
decides to make such a reference on its own initiative.50 Another sec-
tion of the ABA, however, has become concerned about the imposition
of undue hardship on the parties to the dispute. For that reason, the
ABA thought it might be necessary to provide in the proposed United
States legislation that reference to the ICJ should be limited to cases
where both parties agree to the reference.5'
The ABA also suggested that it be made clear that the American
court presenting a question to the ICJ include in the reference materials
a review of the parties' views of the issue.52 In most cases, this might
eliminate the need for the parties to participate in the proceedings
before the Court.53 The need for the parties to participate, however,
remains in the cases where another state has presented differing views
to the Court, or where the State Department has presented the views of
the United States and these views favor one of the parties.54
5. Participation of the State Department
The ABA felt that since matters of international law are of special
importance to the State Department, the proposed legislation should
provide that the State Department be notified of any intended referral
to the ICJ, and that the Department be given ample opportunity to
present its views to the domestic court where the case is pending before
the issue is actually referred to the ICJ. 5
Since any state can present its views once the issue is before the
Court,56 the ABA felt it desirable that the legislation authorize the State
Department, at its own discretion, to present submissions to the Court
that co-parties to a treaty will be far more willing to accept an interpretation of the treaty
when it has come from an impartial international tribunal, as opposed to coming from a
domestic tribunal in a case involving national interests and/or citizens. This will especially
hold true where the particular interpretation is either very favorable to the state asserting the
interpretation, or unfavorable to the interests of the co-parties to the treaty.
50. Hearings, supra note 24, at 52.
51. Id This raises an interesting question discussed infra note 109.
52. ABA FINAL REPoRT, supra note 25, at Introduction 11, 5; Hearings, supra note 24,
at 52-53.
53. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 53.
54. See id
55. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 9.
56. I.C.J. STAT. art. 66.
1983]
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concerning its own interpretation of the disputed treaty.57 This is of
particular importance when the state of nationality of the other party to
the dispute is planning to present its view to the Court.
Considering the special expenses involved for private parties in
such proceedings, the ABA recommended that the legislation establish
a special fund which would enable the American party to properly re-
spond to briefs filed by the State Department, other states, and the for-
eign party.58
6. State Courts' Participation
The ABA recommended that state courts be allowed to participate
in this procedure, and that no ad hoc authorization be required from
any federal authority. 59 The only prerequisite would be authorization
from each respective state legislature.60
7. United Nations and ICJ Proceedings
Although the ABA report dealt primarily with domestic concerns
raised by the proposal, it did make suggestions directed at the interna-
tional arrangements called for by the proposal. First, in establishing
the proposed General Assembly Special Committee, which would act
as an intermediary in presenting the issue or question to the ICJ, the
ABA report recommended that it be specified that the committee be
"structured in the same manner as, and should be given the same
discretion to screen cases as is possessed by," the United Nations Com-
mittee created to deal with appeals from the United Nations Adminis-
trative Tribunal.6 1 The proposed Special Committee would then act
primarily as a screening agent, protecting the Court from frivolous is-
sues and, moreover, safeguarding the Court from potentially explosive
political issues. 62
Second, the ABA noted that "[it might be necessary for the Inter-
national Court of Justice to adopt special procedural rules to deal with
57. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 10; see also Hearings, supra note 24, at 53.
58. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 10.
59. Hearings, supra note 24, at 53; see also ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 9.
60. See ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 9.
61. Hearings, supra note 24, at 54. The first case to come before the ICJ for an advisory
opinion under that procedure was Application for Review of Judgement No. 158 of the
United Nations Administrative Tribunal, 1973 I.C.J. (Advisory Opinion) [hereinafter cited as
Review of Judgment No. 158].
62. See generally Hearings, supra note 24, at 46, 48-49 (comments by Mr. Essaye), 17
(comments by Mr. Small), and 25 (comments by Mr. Birenbaum); ABA FINAL REPORT,
supra note 25, at 7.
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this new type ofjurisdiction."'63 For example, the ABA report suggested
that rules be proposed that would allow the Court to hear cases in
chambers rather than in plenary session.64 This would not only allow
the Court to hear cases on shorter notice, but also to sit in the country
where the matter originated. Some believe that by sitting in smaller
chambers the Court would be able to render its opinions more
quickly.65
Finally, the ABA proposed that the new procedure allow the par-
ties, if they both agree, to submit their briefs or to appear before the
Court.6 6 In order to avoid any problems involved in amending the
Court's Statute to allow individuals to appear before the Court, the
ABA report states that the parties could appear before the Court under
the auspices of either the Special Committee or of their respective
governments. 67
C. Conclusion
The proposal is seen as a means of "kiling-two-birds-with-one-
stone."6 It is thought that this proposal would increase the activity of
the Court and thereby enhance its role.69 Additionally, the resolution
of international issues by a specialized international body might
"strengthen the body of world law." 70
Certainly the proposal bears an aura of credibility; however, the
credibility and feasibility of the proposal fades upon close examination
of the potential problems inherent in this plan for reform of the ICJ.
Il1. POTENTIAL PROBLEMS
Should the proposal gain passage in both houses of Congress,71
there is no certainty that it would be approved by the White House.
63. Review of Judgment No. 158, supra note 61.
64. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 11.
65. Hearings, supra note 24, at 54.
66. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 11.
67. Id
68. Address by Professor Riesenfeld, Hastings College of the Law, at the Connecticut
Conference on the President's Report on the Reform and Restructuring of the United Na-
tions System (1978) [hereinafter cited as Address by Riesenfeld].
69. Id at 7; Hearings, supra note 24, at 2.
70. Hearings, supra note 24, at 2.
71. Neither resolution was the subject of committee action in either the 96th or 97th
Congress. The problems with gaining action on these resolutions were twofold: "first, the
press of more urgent legislative business and second, the decided lack of enthusiasm in the
Congress for use of [the Court]." Letter from G. Warburg, Legislative Assistant to Senator
Cranston, to the author (October 6, 1982).
1983]
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The present administration has voiced no opinion on the subject; how-
ever, both the Department of State and the Department of Justice have
expressed their hesitancy and disapproval."
The proposal, because it represents a reform of the ICJ, will also
face a severe challenge in both the General Assembly and the Security
Council.7 3 It will be especially difficult gaining the required unanimity
of the five permanent members of the Security Council.74 This is un-
likely to occur as long as some of the members of the Security Council
are opposed to extension of the Court's activities. 5
Even among the allies of the United States, most of whom openly
support the ICJ,76 very little interest was voiced when this proposal was
suggested as a possible means of enhancing the Court's role in the
world community.7 7 This disinterest might be due to the numerous po-
tential problems which may arise from this proposal. The most clearly
foreseeable of these potential problems are discussed below.
A. International Consequences
The United Nations originally conceived of the ICJ as the ultimate
adjudicator of disputes between states.78 It is of paramount importance
that the Court always remains available to fulfill this function. It is
possible that any added activities, beyond what the Court is presently
called upon by its Statute to perform, might impair the Court's ability
to execute this important function. If a great number of states took
advantage of this proposed procedure, the Court could become deluged
with "trivial, inappropriate, needlessly involved, unripe and politically
72. Hearings, supra note 24, at 7-9 (letter from Richard Fairbanks, Assistant Secretary
for Congressional Relations, Dep't of State), 72-74 (letter from Robert McConnell, Assistant
Attorney General, Office of Legislative Affairs, Dep't of Justice).
73. See WIDENING AccEss, supra note 4, at 47; see also Gamble & Fischer, stpra note
5, at 172.
74. See Gamble & Fischer, supra note 5, at 172.
75. During the Sixth Committee's review of the role of the ICJ, the Soviet delegate, Mr.
Kolesnik, stated that his "delegation re-emphasized the fact that any review of the Court's
role and any attempt to undermine [the ICJ's] Statute and the Charter of the United Nations
were unacceptable." 25 U.N. GAOR C.6 (1229th mtg.) at 6, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR.1229
(1970). The representative of the Ukrainian SSR, Mr. Makarevich, stated that "any modifi-
cation of the character, functions and authority of one of the main organs of the United
Nations would jeopardize the other main organs, particularly the Security Council," 25
U.N. GAOR C.6 (1229th mtg.) at 9, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/SR. 1229 (1970). See Szasz, stpra
note 13, at 509.
76. See the comments of the United States allies during the Sixth Committee's meet-
ings, supra note 3.
77. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 18-19 (statements by Mr. Small).
78. Rovine, supra note 1, at 314.
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sensitive cases."7 9 The Court would be hard-pressed to provide ade-
quate time for each case and, at the same time, remain available to hear
disputes between states. The rendering of advisory opinions might
come to constitute the vast majority of the Court's business. If this
were to occur, the ICJ could become viewed as nothing more than a
legal counselor to states and their national courts. States might look to
other sources to adjudicate their disputes."0
The production of opinions by the ICJ which are not binding upon
states, and which can be disregarded by a national court for any reason,
would be unlikely to build the Court's prestige and effectiveness in the
world community. What would be more likely to happen is that a
number of the Court's opinions would be disregarded and that the
Court's prestige would suffer as a result.
If a number of the Court's opinions are disregarded, they will lose
much of their authority as mandates of international law. In a situa-
tion where the Court has rendered an opinion on an unclear area of
international law and the national court has disregarded that opinion, a
great deal of confusion could be created among other national courts
dealing with similar issues in terms of whether to follow the opinion of
the ICJ or to follow that of the particular national court.
1. Politicalization of the Court
Once the proposal is presented to the United Nations General As-
sembly, there is no guarantee that the proposal as presented will remain
unchanged. It is very likely that states within the General Assembly
will seek to modify the proposal so that the Special Committee could
receive or initiate requests for advisory opinions without limitations.8'
It is also possible that debate over this subject in the General Assembly
might stimulate further reform of the Court's advisory opinion process,
or ultimately the ICJ itself, in a "manner inconsistent with U.S.
interests."82
The Court could become a political tool. It would be possible
79. Szasz, supra note 13, at 517.
80. One alternative source is through the Permanent Court of Arbitration, established
at the 1899 Convention for the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes. See J. RALSTON, INTERNA-
TIONAL ARBITRATION FROM ATHENS TO LOCARNO (1929). See also J. STONE, LEGAL CON-
TROLS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT (1954). States' use of alternative methods of dispute
resolution, such as arbitration, are not inherently bad. However, such alternative methods
cannot help but detract to some degree from the Court's prestige.
81. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 66 (etter from Mr. Boyd).
82. Id For example, if the proposal were modified so as to allow states unlimited access
to the Court's advisory jurisdiction, the Court might become a political soapbox which some
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under this procedure for an individual or nation to manufacture litiga-
tion, in the United States or in another country, in order to get a politi-
cally sensitive issue before the Court.83 The purpose for this action
could be to embarrass the ICJ, another state, or merely to seek support
for an unpopular political position.
It is not inconceivable that this procedure could be used by a citi-
zen of a state in order to challenge the foreign policy or conduct of that
state by bringing the issue before the ICJ. As an illustration, if this
procedure had existed in the early 1970's, it might have been possible
for a citizen of the United States to bring the issue of the United States
involvement in Viet Nam before the Court.84
The politicalization of the ICJ would spell the end of the Court as
a viable means of impartial resolution of disputes between states.
2. Politicalization of the Process
It is very likely that a United Nations Committee like that set forth
in the proposal, responsible for screening requests for opinions on in-
ternational law questions of potentially significant impact on member
states' national interests, would become very politicized.85 Seats on this
Special Committee could become highly coveted prizes among the
member states.
It is not uncommon for member states within the United Nations
to use supposedly neutral agencies of the United Nations as leverage
against other states.8 6 This procedure might merely broaden the battle-
field within the United Nations on which the member states politically
joust with one another.
3. Abstract Questions
The ICJ was not intended to function in a vacuum. 8 7 Therefore
the Court should only answer questions or give opinions when there
exists an "element of concreteness which enables the Court to relate it
states might use to voice their feelings toward the United States and its allies; witness the
General Assembly which is generally recognized as being highly politicized.
83. Id at 47-48 (statements by Mr. Leach).
84. See id The actual case involving the United States presence in Viet Nam was heard
and decided in a United States federal court. United States v. Berrigan, 283 F. Supp. 336
(D. Md. 1968), aftd, 417 F.2d 1009 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 909 (1970),
85. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 17 (statements of Mr. Small).
86. A recent example of this is the Arab attempt to oust Israel from the International
Telecommunications Union, a specialized agency of the United Nations. See San Francisco
Chron., Oct. 22, 1982, at I, col. 1; San Francisco Chron., Oct. 15, 1982, at 19, col. 3,
87. 0. LIssITzYN, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 30 (1951).
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to the actual developments and needs of the international commu-
nity."88 One potential danger resulting from the Court rendering advi-
sory opinions on abstract issues or questions is that the Court might be
accused of taking a radical stand and overextending its power.8 9
Another danger exists in that in resolving abstract issues, there is a
potential for affecting a wide range of related issues. States might inad-
vertently perceive the Court's opinions as creating more law than was
intended to be created.90 These inadvertent "precedents" could create
a great deal of confusion among states as to the status of certain areas
of international law.9'
The ICJ, as with most courts, was primarily set up to settle conten-
tious disputes and not to give advice. Major diversions from this func-
tion raise serious problems.
4. Loss of a Source of International Law
Judicial decisions of domestic courts have had a significant impact
upon the development of international law.92 The courts of the United
States in particular have been recognized by the ICI for their
competence.93
With this procedure available, national courts might be hesitant to
deal with international issues. They might feel compelled to seek the
88. Id Abstract interpretations often tend to have "a quasi-constitutional, rather than a
judicial character." Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Na-
tions, 1948 I.C.J. Pleadings 8, 89-90 (Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948). But Vf. the opin-
ions of Azevedo, J., Conditions -of Admission of a State to Membership in the United
Nations, 1948 I.CJ. 57, 73 (Advisory Opinion of May 28, 1948). Azevedo, J., felt that the
Court should only handle abstract questions in its advisory capacity.
89. 0. LIssrrzYN, supra note 87, at 16-17. Note the statements made by the communist
representatives before the Sixth Committee. Supra note 75.
90. Judgments from the ICJ are frequently overshadowed by the "bulk of separate and
dissenting opinions." Statements of Mrs. Rosalyn Higgins, member of the American Society
of International Law, reprinted in 64 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 256 (1970). Rather than a
single unified opinion coming from the Court on an issue of international law, a party re-
questing an opinion might possibly receive 15 separate opinions on that area of the law. It is
possible that one of the Justices of the Court might feel inclined to go further in his dicta
than the question presented to the Court required. It has been stated that where there exists
no developed law, judges are encouraged to "rely... on their own prejudices or preferred
policy outcomes." Rovine, supra note 1, at 316.
91. Political experts and international scholars might have quite a task on their hands
trying to pull some of consensus out of the separate opinions.
92. Lillich, The Proper Role of.Domestic Courts in the International Legal Order, I I VA.
J. INT'L L. 9 (1970); C. PARRY, THE SOURCES AND EVIDENCES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 61-
82 (1965).
93. Interhandel Case (Switz v. U.S.), 1959 I.C.J. 6, 101 (Judgment of March 21) (Lau-
terpacht, J., dissenting).
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ICJ's advice on matters of international concern. If so, an important
source of international law would be lost, or at least significantly
impaired.94
B. National Consequences
1. Burden of Time and Cost
This procedure involves processes potentially very cumbersome
and costly to the parties involved in the original dispute. There are a
number of steps involved in the operation of this procedure. The more
notable steps include: the suspension of the litigation so that the parties
can decide whether to refer a question to the ICJ; drafting of the docu-
ments and materials by the national court and the parties to be submit-
ted to the ICJ; proceedings before the Special Committee of the
General Assembly to determine whether the question should go before
the Court; proceedings before the ICJ on the question; and proceedings
before the domestic court on whether the ICJ's ruling should be ac-
cepted, and if so, how it should be interpreted.
Aside from the burden of time required for this procedure, there
are also significant costs to the parties incumbent in this procedure. 95
The costs will be even greater if the parties or their legal representatives
are required to go before the Court at the Hague, the seat of the
Court.9 6
This problem takes on more significance if this procedure can be
invoked at the request of only one of the parties to the litigation, or by
the court's discretion. These burdens of time and cost would then be
forced upon one or both of the parties without their consent.97
The Department of State, since it bears responsibility for the inter-
ests of the United States, will also have to bear a significant burden
under this procedure. Because of the vast interests of the United States,
the State Department will have to monitor all the cases which might
94. Address by Riesenfeld, supra note 68, at 8.
95. The ABA proposed in its report that a special fund be established to help deter these
costs to the parties. ABA FINAL REPORT, supra note 25, at 10. However this funding would
only be available in a case where the State Department or a foreign state enters into the
preliminary opinion case. Id It is also worth mentioning that during these times of fiscal
belt-tightening, it is doubtful that Congress or the President would approve any significant
allocation of funds to the State Department for this purpose.
96. I.C.J. STAT. art. 22.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 103-112, for a discussion of the constitutional
issues raised. It has been noted that reference to the ICJ for an advisory opinion may be-
come a device for buying time, or merely wasting it. Reisman, Accelerating Advisory Opin.
ions: Critique and Proposal, 68 AM. J. INT'L L. 648, 650 (1974).
[Vol. 6
ICJ Advisory Opinions
invoke this procedure and refer a question to the ICJ. 98 If a question
which involves interests of the United States does go before the Court,
the State Department will be responsible for presenting the views of the
United States to the Court.99 These responsibilities, on top of the re-
sponsibilities already borne by the State Department, represent a sig-
nificant added burden for the State Department. 100
2. Constitutional Issues'0 t
Initially there appears to be no significant constitutional problems
with the proposal as drafted. This is primarily due to the fact that
(1) the opinions from the ICJ would not be binding upon the national
court requesting the opinion,10 2 and (2) there is no superior review by
the ICJ, and therefore no possibility of reversal of a Supreme Court
decision.'03 Opponents of the proposal, however, have argued the un-
constitutionality of the proposal on several grounds.,
First, opponents of the proposal assert that it is the fundamental
right of every American citizen to have his or her case heard and de-
cided by an American court.10 This referral process, opponents claim,
violates this constitutional right.'06 Second, the opponents of the pro-
posal claim that allowing federal courts to petition the ICJ for advisory
opinions is inconsistent with the "cases and controversies clause" of the
Constitution."7
The aforementioned arguments against the proposal are substan-
98. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 53 (statements of Professor Sohn).
99. Id
100. Stephen Schwegel, commenting on a proposal that the United States should submit
a number of not particularly important territorial disputes to the ICJ in order to give it some
business, stated that:
It is asking much of the harrassed legal advisors of the State Department and their
opposite numbers in certain foreign ministries to devote the time and effort re-
quired to litigate non-disputes before the Court. They have more pressing things
to do. The Office of the Legal Advisor of the Department of State is not set up to
litigate; when the United States is involved in the rare international adjudication,
that office has to improvise to draw together the staff necessary to do the work."
. GAMBLE & D. FISCHER, supra note 12, at 22-23 n.s (1976).
101. It is beyond the scope of this Note to examine fully all possible constitutional issues
that this proposal raises. The basic purpose of this Note is to point out the potential
problems with this proposal.
102. Address by Riesenfeld, supra note 68, at 7.
103. WIDENnG ACCESS, supra note 4, at 46.
104. Hearings, supra note 24, at 55-61 (letter from Mr. Shipley, partner, Shipley, Smoak,
& Akerman), 67 (Letter from Mr. Boyd).
105. Id at 60.
106. See id
107. Id at 57. The Supreme Court has held firm to its ruling that it will not render
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tive in nature and would be decided by constitutional interpretation if
the proposal were to be enacted and subsequently challenged. 10 8 There
are also some potential procedural problems which could surface de-
pending upon the procedures implemented with the proposal. If, for
example, only one party to the original litigation needs to request the
referral of the question, or if the domestic court can refer the question
at its own discretion, the issue of due process of law is raised. 10 9 The
implementation of this proposal would promise years of litigation in
the federal courts over the constitutionality of this referral
procedure. 10
C. Conclusion
The proponents of the proposal, while emphasizing the desirability
of expanding the ICJ's jurisdiction, have not articulated any specific
need for a referral procedure from the standpoint of United States liti-
gants or the United States judicial system. Opponents of the proposal
have pointed out that the judicial system of the United States has func-
tioned efficiently and met the needs of its citizenry adequately for over
200 years without such a referral process. 11'
While proponents of the proposal assert that it will act as a remedy
for the problems which have hampered the effectiveness of the ICJ, "'
the proposal itself does not squarely address the primary problem
which plagues the Court. The proposal assumes that the ICJ is suffer-
ing from underavailability. It seeks to correct the problem by widening
the access to the Court. The problem affecting the Court, however, is
not underavailability, but rather underutilization. 1 3 The proposal
would therefore merely increase the vast potential of the Court, which
advisory opinions, and that it is an established principle of law in the United States, C. and
S. Airlines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113-14 (1947).
108. Mr. Boyd, in his written statement to the House subcommittee, stated that "it seems
important that careful legal analysis be undertaken to determine whether or not the proce-
dure proposed. . . would be likely to withstand challenges grounded in the U.S. Constitu-
tion." Hearings, supra note 24, at 67.
109. Id This could create an interesting situation. If the proposal requires only one
party to request a referral, the proposal raises constitutional problems. If, however, both
parties are required to request the referral before the procedure is activated, then the propo-
sal has less chance of being used. Since our legal system is an adversarial one, procedural
issues are contested just as vigorously as substantive issues. It is difficult to imagine a situa-
tion where all the parties would find it in their best interest to refer a question to the ICJ and
incur the additional costs and time delays.
110. These are additional costs which this proposal will impose on the United States.
I 11. Hearings, supra note 24, at 63.
112. See id at 2-3.
113. M. POMERANCE, supra note 12, at 379.
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is all but squandered by distrustful states which are unwilling to submit
themselves to the jurisdiction of the IC.. "4
Considering the enormity of the effort which will be required if
any meaningful reform is to have a chance of success, I 5 some consid-
eration should first be given to alternative proposals which might offer
a more direct and practical means of solving the Court's problem of
underutilization. Efforts to help the Court would be far more effective
if they were concentrated into a single effort at a truly meaningful
reform.
One such proposal would be for proponents of the ICJ in the
United States to pass legislation repealing the United States reserva-
tion' 16 to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. 7
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSAL
The United States, while claiming to be one of the Court's
staunchest supporters,"I8 has in its acceptance of the ICJ's jurisdiction
one of the most crippling reservations to the Court's compulsory juris-
diction. 19 Under the Connolly Amendment, 120 the United States may
refuse to submit itself to any matter before the ICJ that the United
States deems to be of domestic concern. 12 1
Some have characterized the United States declaration of 1946,
wherein it purported to accept the jurisdiction of the ICJ, as an "ill-
disguised rejection."' 22 Justice Lauterpacht, in his dissenting opinion in
the Interhandel case, wrote that he felt that the reservation actually in-
validated the United States acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction. 23
The Connolly Amendment has remained the subject of debate and dis-
cussion among international scholars and diplomats since its incorpo-
ration into the United States acceptance of the Court's jurisdiction.124
114. See Address by Philip C. Jessup (Apr. 30, 1971), 65 PROC. AMI. Soc'Y INT'L L 261,
262 (1971).
115. Gamble & Fischer, supra note 5, at 172.
116. See supra note 29.
117. I.CJ. STAT. art. 36(2).
118. See Hearings, supra note 24, at 7.
119. See supra note 29.
120. The reservation is called the Connolly Amendment because its sponsor was Repre-
sentative Connolly. See Howard, supra note 29.
121. See supra note 29. The issue of domestic versus international jurisdiction has been
one of the most controversial subjects of discussion throughout the history of the Interna-
tional Court. E. DEUTSCH, AN INTERNATIONAL RULE OF LAW 201 (1977).
122. T. FRANCK, THE STRUCTURE OF IMPARTIALITY 98 (1968).
123. Interhandel Case, supra note 93, at 98.
124. See ag., Howard, supra note 29; Merrills, supra note 28; Crawford, The Legal Effect
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The primary objection to this type of subjective reservation is that
it is incompatible with the system of compulsory jurisdiction.1 2s In
such a system, a court's exclusive power to determine whether matters
are within its jurisdiction is paramount. 2 6 Adherents to the reservation
claim, however, that it is vital to the interests of the state and, provided
that the subjective power is used in good faith by the state, it will not
lead to abuse. 27
During the negotiations over the jurisdiction of the ICJ, the
United States insisted that international law was too vague and indefi-
nite as a measuring rod for domestic jurisdiction. 28 Despite the con-
tinued arguments that the Court's "function is to decide in accordance
with international law,"' 12 9 the United States has chosen to maintain its
self-judging reservation. 30
This apparent self-indulgent attitude of the United States has
raised some suspicions that the United States has a double standard
and prefers to use impartial adjudication only when the use of force or
coercion is not to its advantage.'13  Questions might be raised as to how
the United States can claim on the one hand to be one of the Court's
most avid supporters, and on the other hand withhold from the Court
its uncompromised submission to its jurisdiction. The United States
support of this proposal to widen access to the ICJ and to allow domes-
tic courts to request advisory opinions, might be perceived by states as
of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the International Court, 50 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L
L. 63 (1979); U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, supra note 20. See also the General Assembly's 1974
resolution, supra note 19.
125. 1 S. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 397.
126. Id
127. Id and accompanying footnotes.
128. R. RUSSELL, A HISTORY OF THE UNITED NATIONS CHARTER 902 (1958). This type
of feeling among the states established a vicious circle in that states would not submit to the
Court because they claimed that international law was too uncertain, and yet the reason for
this was that the Court was presented with very few opportunities to refine and develop
international law. 0. LissITzYN, supra note 87, at 70.
129. I.C.J. STAT. art. 38.
130. The Executive Branch has regularly expressed doubts over the consistency of the
reservation. See, e.g., Revision of the U.N. Charter. Hearings Before the Senate Comm. onl
Foreign Relations, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 464 (1950). An effort was made in 1959 by the
Administration to repeal the Connolly Amendment. A resolution was introduced to that
end into the Senate on March of 1959. After exhaustive hearings held in 1960, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee decided to postpone further action. Compulsory Jurisdiction of
the IC: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess. 1
(1960). There have also been some recent indications that the Executive branch has had
some second thoughts on the value of the Connolly Amendment. U.S. DEPT. op STATE,
supra note 20; see also WIDENING AccEss, supra note 4.
131. T. FRANCK, supra note 122, at 100.
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merely an attempt by the United States to detract from its refusal to
submit to the Court's jurisdiction.
The failure of the vast majority of the member states of the United
Nations to submit to the jurisdiction of the ICJ becomes significant
when one notes that there appears to be a consensus among scholars
that until nations subscribe to the unreserved jurisdiction of the ICJ,
the Court will have little chance of progressing and attaining the posi-
tion envisioned for it by its framers. 13 2 Unfortunately, the trend ap-
pears to be towards a greater use of reservations. 33
If the United States sincerely desires to become a spokesperson for
a revitalized and effective Court, it can best do so by showing its own
confidence in the Court by revoking its reservation to the Court's juris-
diction and encouraging other states to do the same. 34 Some scholars
believe that if the United States were to revoke its reservation, other
states would follow suit. 135
The United States could still protect itself from being beset by
suits by simply including in its acceptance of the Court's compulsory
jurisdiction a stipulation that it applies only where the state bringing
the action before the Court has likewise accepted the Court's compul-
sory jurisdiction. 36 This would prevent the United States from being
brought before the Court by states who only utilize the Court when it is
to their advantage.
Under present circumstances, it is doubtful that the United States
will submit itself to the ICJ under its current structure. There is a
growing sense of skepticism in the United States over the value and
worth of the United Nations system.' 37 To many, the United Nations
has become nothing more than a tool of the communist and third world
132. See ag., E. DEUTSCH, supra note 121, at 293; M. HUDSON, INTERNATIONAL TRiBu-
NALS 153 (1944); Address by Hisashi Owada (Apr. 30, 1971), reprinted in 65 PRoc. Amt.
Soc'Y INT'L L. 268 (1971).
133. Merrills, supra note 28, at 116.
134. Professor Gross has stated that a "state which would encourage other states to show
confidence in the Court must itself show confidence." Gross, supra note 31, at 38-39. He
stated further that no United States representative can show such confidence as long as the
present reservation stands. Id at 39.
135. Merrills, supra note 28, at 116.
136. This provision is currently included in the United States' acceptance of the Court's
jurisdiction under article 36(2) of its Statute. The provision states that the United States
recognizes the Court's compulsory jurisdiction "in relation to any other State accepting the
same obligation." See supra note 29.
137. Safire, Move the U.N. to Moscow orRiadh, San Francisco Chron., Oct. 15, 1982, at
54, coL 5. See also the statements of Mr. Shipley before the House Subcommittee. Hearings,
supra note 24, at 55-56.
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countries with which to attack the United States and its allies. 138 The
Court itself recently suffered a loss of esteem in the eyes of many
Americans after it was unable to adequately resolve the Iranian Hos-
tage dispute. 139
The United States, however, is not alone in its hesitancy to submit
disputes to the ICJ. 140 Professor Deutsch, in a recent work, stated three
reasons why states would not be willing to submit to the jurisdiction of
the ICJ. These reasons are: the states' unwillingness to give up their
sovereignty to the extent necessary to accept the compulsory jurisdic-
tion of an international tribunal;' 4 1 the hesitancy of most states to sub-
mit important problems to judges whose supposedly strong national
allegiances might change their perspectives;142 and the unwillingness of
nations to entrust a mere majority of a quorum of an international tri-
bunal with power to determine which matters are within a state's juris-
diction and which "fall within the permissible scope of international
adjudication."' 143
Recently, proposals have been proffered that would alleviate many
of these concerns and encourage states to accept the compulsory juris-
diction of the ICJ. Two of the more salient proposals involve the re-
form of the Statute of the ICJ, 1 and the establishment of regional
international courts. 145
A. Reform of the Court
Professor Deutsch has proposed three reforms of the Court in or-
der to increase its attractiveness as an adjudicator to nation-states. The
first two proposals are directed at the Justices of the Court, while the
third proposal is aimed at the procedures of the Court.
The first reform would require all Justices of the Court to re-
138. Id
139. Case Concerning United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v,
Iran), 1980 IC.J. 3 (Judgment of May 24).
140. Well over 50% of the member states of the United Nations have never even ap-
peared before the ICJ, much less submitted a dispute to it. See Gamble & Fischer, supra
note 5.
141. E. DEUTSCH, supra note 121, at 2.
142. Id
143. Id at 2-3.
144. Id at 3-17.
145. See Mosler, Supra-National Judicial Decisions and National Courts, 4 HASTINGS
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 425,447 (1981); see also Address by Cipriano Codas (1964), reprinted




nounce their citizenship and become "citizen[s] of the world."' 4 6 This
would allegedly dispel much of the fear possessed by states that the
judges would be swayed by their maintaining their citizenship with an-
other state. This proposal has been criticized by some as both an insult
to the integrity of the Justices of the Court and as being founded upon
unsubstantiated beliefs. 147
The second reform would have Justices of the Court appointed for
life, or at least for a substantial period of time.' 48  This proposal, like
the first, is aimed at relieving the fear of states that the Justices of the
Court will be prejudiced in their decision making by their nationality
and a knowledge that they would return to their native country after
their term of office with the Court.
Included in this proposal is the stipulation that the present system
of using ad hoc judges would cease. 14 9 It has been shown fairly con-
vincingly through research that ad hoc judges tend to be influenced in
their decisions by their nationality. 150
The final reform would require a vote of ten judges in order to
overrule a motion for jurisdiction of the Court over a dispute asserted
to be within the domestic jurisdiction of a state involved.' 51 Currently,
a simple majority of a quorum is all that is needed.' 52
With these improvements of the present framework of the Court's
statute, states might be more inclined to submit themselves to the juris-
diction of the Court.
146. E. DEUTrscH, supra note 121, at 6. The judge, along with his or her spouse, would
enjoy worldwide immunity. Upon the death of the judge, the spouse would still enjoy the
immunity for two years, after which he or she could become a citizen of the state of his or
her choice. Id
147. Statements of P. Jessup (Apr. 30, 1971), reprinted in 65 PROc. Am. Soc'Y I.'T'L L
282 (1971).
148. E. DEUTrscH, supra note 121, at 7. The provisions of this reform also provide that
the judges would be appointed to the Court between the ages of 50 and 65 years. Retirement
would be permissible at 70, and compulsory at the age of 75. Id at 296. Justices of the ICJ
currently serve for terms of nine years. I.C.I STAT. art. 13(l).
149. Under the current Statute of the ICJ, if none of the judges of the Court is a national
of a country which is a party to the case before the Court, that country has the right to
demand that a judge of its nationality sit with the Court if a judge of the nationality of the
other party to the case is a member of the Court. LC.J. STAT. art. 31(2). Under the pro-
posed reforms, whenever there is a need for more judges to sit in on a case, the Court itself
will select the ad hoc judge(s) from the ranks of the retired Justices of the Court, or from
persons, "not of the nationality of any party to the cause, previously nominated but not
elected to the Court.' E. DEUTrsCH, supra note 121, at 10.
150. See E. DEUTrsCH, supra note 121, at 296-300. See also H. LAuTERPACHT, THE
FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY 230 (reprint 1966).
151. E. DEUTrscH, supra note 121, at 9-11.
152. LCJ. STAT. art. 25(3).
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B. Regional Courts
Recently there has been a trend towards the greater use of regional
international courts. 53 The most notable example of a regional inter-
national court is that of the Court of the European Common Market,
established under the Treaty of Rome.'54
The apparent reason for the popularity of regional courts is that
they are generally specialized courts, in that they have only limited
subject matter jurisdiction and they only have jurisdiction over a small
number of homogeneous states with common objectives.' 55 Judges for
these regional courts are generally obtained exclusively from the small
number of nations over which the court has jurisdiction. 15 6 These fac-
tors tend to dispel any distrust or fears that the states which are subject
to the court's jurisdiction might have.
It is possible that a network of regional courts could be established
with each possessing compulsory jurisdiction over the states located
within its region. 57 The ICJ could maintain its viable role in the world
community as an appellate court, having the authority to hear selected
cases and to give advisory opinions where clarification of international
law is needed.5 8
The North American Hemisphere is one example of such a re-
gional area, in which an international tribunal would have jurisdiction
over such states as the United States, Canada, and Mexico. The subject
matter of this particular regional international court could be limited
initially or indefinitely to such areas as borders, illegal immigration,
fishing rights, and trade.
The only potential problem posed by this proposal is that these
numerous regional courts could result in a nonuniform body of inter-
national law. The interpretation of an area of international law might
vary with each region. The presence of the ICJ as an appellate overseer
153. Mosler, supra note 145, at 428.
154. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, March 25, 1957, arts. 164-
88, 298 U.N.T.S. 11.
155. Mosler, supra note 145, at 428.
156. Address by Cipriano Codas, supra note 145, at 169.
157. One suggestion is to have these regional courts act merely as clerks for the ICJ,
gathering and producing all proofs and allegations by the parties and transmitting them to
the Court, along with a reasoned statement of the facts. Id
158. It is possible that this procedure might require an amendment to the Court's Statute
in order for the Court to receive requests from these regional courts. A Special Commission,
like that proposed in the Congressional resolutions, could be established and thereby avoid
the problems of amending the Court's Statute. An alternative could be that where there
exist major differences in the interpretation of some area of international law among the
regional courts, a request for an advisory opinion could come from the General Assembly,
[Vol, 6
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might ease the problem, but not eliminate it entirely.'59
C. Conclusion
The ultimate objective must be to obtain acceptance of the Court's
compulsory jurisdiction by as many states as possible. The largest hur-
dle in the way of this acceptance appears to be most states' distrust of
the Court as it currently exists. Through reforms of the Court's statute,
the ICJ might come to be viewed in a far more favorable light. The
reforms of the Court's statute discussed above, although not having any
practical effect upon the operation of the Court, could serve to dispel
any fears of bias surrounding the Court.
If obtaining compulsory jurisdiction for the ICJ is not a practical
or feasible proposition at this time, the same goals could be advanced
through the establishment of regional international courts possessing
compulsory jurisdiction.
In any event, both proposals present a more practical and direct
approach to enhancing and ensuring the role of the ICJ in the future.
V. CONCLUSION
With the incredible destructive force possessed by certain states, it
is now more imperative than ever to "restrict as much as possible the
sphere where sheer strength is an argument and to extend as widely as
possible the area ruled by considerations of law and justice."'11
The threat to the ICJ not only endangers the Court, but also
threatens injury to "the interests of the United Nations system as a
whole and to the structure of international law."'' Unfortunately, it
appears that over the last twenty years the trend has been for states,
especially among the developing nations, to lean more towards political
rather than judicial settlement.' 62 This trend represents a serious threat
159. There would still be no guarantee that the courts requesting the opinion, in this case
the regional courts, would adopt the opinion of the ICJ. This problem could be avoided by
placing a provision in the Court's Statute that before the Court renders an opinion to an
outside court, the outside court must agree that the Court's opinion will be binding upon the
parties.
160. Annual Report of the Secretary General on the Work of the Organization, Report
of the Secretary-General, 10 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 1) at xii, U.N. Doc. A/2911 (1955).
161. M. POMERANCE, supra note 12, at 153 (citing a Finnish delegate, at 19-20, U.N.
Doc. S/PV.1550 (July 1970)).
162. See 1 S. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 15. Professor Rovine has found that third world
countries have little confidence in "legal systems in whose making they played no role and
whose output is still largely determined by western-dominated legal conceptions." Rovine,
supra note 1, at 315.
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to world peace.
The existence of a system of judicial recourse open to all the na-
tions of the world implies not only that disputes among states can be
settled through the application of law; it implies much more. It implies
"common ideas of the meaning of the abstract notions 'right,' 'law,'
[and the] 'application of law.' "163 Without these elements, the hope
that the nations of the world can exist together in peace is a slim one.
The supporters of the proposed resolution to expand the advisory
jurisdiction, although understanding the importance of the ICJ, have
apparently misread the problems which afflict and hamper the effec-
tiveness of the Court. In merely widening the scope of the Court's ad-
visory jurisdiction, the proposal, besides posing many potential dangers
to the Court and the interests of the United States, fails to address the
principal hindrance to the Court's success: its lack of compulsory
jurisdiction.
Ultimately, the success or failure of the Court will not depend so
much upon its institutional ties linking it with different organizations or
organs, or "with this or that conception of the nature of its judicial task,
as on the readiness of the States to make use of the Court."' 164 Compul-
sory jurisdiction ensures the states' readiness to use the Court.
The importance of compulsory jurisdiction is basically threefold:
it disseminates among public and professional diplomats the "idea that
judicial settlement of international disputes is both possible and desira-
ble;"' 161 it enhances the general prestige and standing of the Court;1 66
and it ensures that referral of a legal dispute to the Court will not be
defeated through the inability to reach an agreement on the terms of
the referral on a diplomatic level.167
Thus, if the proponents of the ICJ within the United States truly
want to enhance the Court's role in the world community, the most
practical and direct approach is to get the United States to revoke its
reservation to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction. Until there exists an
international tribunal "in whose judges' complete independence and
integrity the nation states can have complete confidence, with compul-
sory jurisdiction over all of the states, and with plenary power to adju-
dicate all disputes among them," the objective of world peace and
163. 1 S. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 101.
164. Id at 100.





security is far from being realized. 6 '
This alternative proposal, besides representing a more direct and
practical approach to enhancing the role of the ICJ in the world com-
muity, poses few, if any, of the potential problems inherent in the
Congressional proposal. This is due largely to the fact that this alterna-
tive proposal does not require the participation or approval of any
United Nations organization or organ.' 69 Additionally, since the alter-
native proposal is a unilateral act on the part of the United States, it
could not be perceived by other nation states as a subtle attempt at
reforming or restructuring the Court. 70
Gaining passage of legislation revoking the United States reserva-
tion to the Court's compulsory jurisdiction will not be easily obtained.
Recent dealings with the ICJ have not instilled great confidence in the
Court.' 7' However, considering the alternatives to maintaining world
peace and the situation the world now faces, the United States might
find it in its own best interests to submit itself to the Court's jurisdiction
and to encourage other states to do the same. 172
Although it will be difficult to persuade the United States to re-
voke its reservation, it is not impossible. Other states possessing similar
reservations to the jurisdiction of the ICJ have recently retreated from
their reservations and have come to more fully accept the Court's com-
pulsory jurisdiction. 73 The United States, as leader of the western-
bloc nations, could precipitate a large number of states revoking their
reservations by revoking its own reservations. 7
Thus, proponents of the Court, rather than waste their time and
efforts on a proposal which carries with it uncertain and potentially
168. E. DEUTSCH, supra note 121, at 29.
169. The provisions for compulsory jurisdiction are currently provided for in the Court's
Statute. I.CJ. STAT. art. 36. Therefore, the United States' decision to revoke its reservation
to the Court's jurisdiction would be a wholly unilateral act and would require no action
from the United Nations.
170. Professor Rosenne warned that any significant change of the ICJ might destroy the
confidence in the Court built up over the past 50 years, "requiring the forces of diplomacy to
accomodate themselves to a new and untried pattern of international judicial settlement." 1
S. ROSENNE, supra note 2, at 421.
171. See supra notes 137-139 and accompanying text.
172. In 1970, Secretary General U. Thant appealed to the members of the U.N. to "give
serious consideration to the advantages of a final settlement and encouraged members to
accept compulsory jurisdiction with as few reservations and limitations as possible." 25
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. I) at 38, U.N. Doe. A/8001/Add. 1 (1970).
173. Both the United Kingdom and Australia have replaced their old reservations with
new, less restrictive reservations. Merrills, supra note 28, at 116.
174. See id
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dangerous consequences, should concert and direct their efforts toward
a more direct and positive proposal as set forth in this Note.
